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Abstract 
The resurgence of populism in Europe and North America is widely thought to have placed 
the rule of law under pressure.  But how many of the relevant developments are indeed 
associated with populism?  And is any such association a contingent or analytic matter: 
does populism inevitably threaten the rule of law, or do other conditions intervene to shape 
its impact? After setting out how I will understand the rule of law and populism, I examine 
the ways in which contemporary populist discourse has challenged the rule of law through a 
variety of mechanisms - notably agenda-setting, policy impact, influencing discretionary 
decisions and convention-trashing - considering the institutional and social conditions which 
conduce to strengthen or weaken these mechanisms in particular contexts.   Finally, I 
consider the implications of the analysis for contemporary criminalisation, assessing how 
many of the factors producing ‘penal populism’ or ‘overcriminalization’ are truly a product of 
populism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
A wave of populism is sweeping across the advanced democracies in the northern 
hemisphere. Though in different forms and to different degrees, populism has begun to shape 
the political life of established democracies including the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Greece, Italy, as well as, perhaps most 
spectacularly in Europe, the more recent democracies of Hungary and Poland.  These 
developments have overturned the conventional sense that, particular social movements 
aside, populism from the mid 20th Century on has been primarily a phenomenon of countries 
with personalised, presidential political systems and radical inequalities, with Latin American 
countries such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela providing prominent examples. 
Populism, is, evidently, posing a major challenge to prevailing political systems, placing 
pressure in particular on established patterns of partisanship and hence on political 
parties.  These factors, along with increasing reliance on ‘directly democratic’ decision-
making mechanisms such as referenda raise fascinating – and urgent – questions about 
some very basic aspects of the rule of law and other features of modern constitutionalism.  
There is an emerging political theory and political science literature which engages 
with the rise of populism, seeking to explain both its origins and its implications for democracy 
across the globe (Benjamin 2016; Brubaker 2017; Ferrari et al. 2018; Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018; 
Pankaj 2017; Mounk 2018; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017; Muller 2016; Rovira Kaltwasser 
2013; Runciman 2018; Urbinati 2014).  But until recently, less has been written about its 
implications for law, or for the rule of law.  While political science analyses of populism have 
invariably noted the tendency of populist regimes to flout or instrumentally exploit the law, 
and to manipulate legal institutions – notably courts – so as to subvert their capacity to disrupt 
political will, legal debates have been slower to focus on populism as a potential threat to the 
rule of law’s integrity.  This is reflected in the fact that a recent, influential collection on 
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law (Adams et al. 2017) features only two references to 
populism, both in relation to Hungary; while the classic Nomos collection (Shapiro ed. 1994) 
mentions it not at all.  Rather, the rule of law has generated a scholarly field dominated by 
legal and philosophical analysis of the scope and meaning of the rule of law or its cousin 
constitutionalism, more recently supplemented by a substantial literature on the rule of law 
as a tool of international relations (Meuwese 2017).   
But in the last few years, things have begun to change, as a result of some 
spectacular, if differing, instances of the capacity of populist politics to put the rule of law 
under pressure even in countries in which its position had been largely seen as secure (Bogg 
& Freedland 2018; Freedland 2018; Walker forthcoming).  The media and political reaction 
to the English High Court’s decision (Miller [2016] EWHC 2768; later upheld by the Supreme 
Court [2017] UKSC 5) that the invocation of Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, 
giving notice of Britain’s intention to leave the EU, should be subject to a parliamentary vote 
called forth an infamous headline describing the judges as ‘enemies of the people,’ in a 
personal attack which was followed by a deafening failure by the then Lord Chancellor to 
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distance the government from the Daily Mail’s populist invective.  Copious signals from the 
Trump administration in the US - regular vilification of courts, a recent attempt to exert 
pressure on  Britain to interfere with a standard sentencing decision (Smith 2018) and the 
President’s expressed belief that he would have a legal right to use his executive power to 
pardon himself should he be successfully indicted as a result of the Mueller inquiry - provide 
key instances which help to explain lawyers’ emerging concern with populism, and with the 
mentality of populist leaders, as distinctive threats to constitutionalism in general and to 
courts in particular.  This concern has recently found voice in a lecture by Justice Susanne 
Baer of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Baer 2018), in which she identified a wide 
range of threats to the rule of law and the independence and integrity of courts across both 
Europe and North America – with particular emphasis on the recent compromising of judicial 
independence in Hungary and Poland.  Her lecture uttered an impassioned and reasoned 
rallying cry for citizens to speak up for constitutionalism and to defend the values through 
which the tyranny which led to the Second World War was laid to rest.    
In this paper, I shall try to give some further analytic focus to these emerging 
concerns by asking three questions.  First, how many of the recent worrying developments 
in terms of apparent erosion of the rule of law in Europe and North America are indeed 
associated with populism?  Second, where such an association can be established, is it a 
contingent or analytic matter: does populism inevitably threaten the rule of law, or do other 
conditions intervene to shape its impact? Are some connections analytic but others 
contingent? And third, what can we learn from this about the scope for minimising the impact 
of rising populism on the rule of law? 
In tackling these issues, I stray as a criminal lawyer into terrain primarily occupied by 
political scientists, political and legal theorists, and constitutional lawyers.  I do so with a very 
particular concern, and one which will help me to carve out a manageable patch of territory 
within an enormous field.  In particular, I am concerned with the way in which the design of 
some forms of political system, under conditions of declining stable partisanship, have 
rendered the law-making process highly responsive to populist considerations, whether 
through resort to mechanisms such as initiatives and referenda or simply through politicians’ 
openness to popular concerns in their shaping and conduct of the legislative agenda, 
irrespective of the commitments made on electoral platforms and hence carrying democratic 
authority.    Legislative populism, if I can put it in that way, has long been notable in relation 
to criminal law, and there is now a relevant comparative literature which considers how this 
change itself relates to broad shifts in political economy.  A substantial part of this literature 
on changing patterns of criminalisation and punishment - including a literature on the 
criminalisation of migrants (Aliverti & Bosworth 2017) - is framed in terms of ‘penal populism’ 
or ‘populist punitiveness’ (Bottoms 1995; Cavadino & Dignan 2005; Lacey 2008a; Pratt 2006; 
Loader and Sparks 2017).   The possibility broached in this literature - that differently 
configured political systems are more or less responsive to penal populist concerns - in turn 
opens up interesting general questions about whether these differences affect their capacity 
to absorb populist pressures without compromising values such as the rule of law and civil 
liberties. 
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The paper proceeds as follows.  In the first two sections, I set out, respectively, how 
I will understand the rule of law and populism for the purposes of my analysis.  In the third 
section, I consider the question of whether there are analytic links between populism and an 
erosion of the rule of law.  In the fourth section, I consider a range of contingent links, and 
examine the institutional and social conditions which conduce to strengthen or weaken them.   
In the final section, I consider the implications for contemporary criminalisation, assessing 
how many of the factors producing what scholars have called ‘penal populism’ or 
‘overcriminalization’ (Husak 2007) are truly a product of populism. 
 
 
APPROACHING THE RULE OF LAW 
 
The vast literature on the rule of law has until relatively recently been preoccupied with a 
cluster of debates about its conceptual contours and scope.  We can distinguish four broad 
approaches.  First, some scholars have taken a formal or ‘thin’ conception of the rule of law 
or legalism – a position most influentially set out by Joseph Raz (1979).  In Raz’s conception, 
the rule of law inheres in a cluster of formal values such as clarity, non-retroactivity, publicity, 
universality of reach, possibility of compliance and congruence between expressed law and 
official enforcement.  Each of these may be achieved to higher or lower degrees by particular 
legal systems.  In a striking metaphor, he imagined the rule of law as a sharpener of law’s 
‘knife’, hence expressing a distinctive and genuine ‘virtue’ of law’s modus operandi of, as Lon 
Fuller (1964, p. 106) put it, ‘subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’.  It makes 
the law sharper and hence more effective; but the law’s ‘sharp knife’ may also be used for 
substantively immoral purposes.  This formal conception of the rule of law is also dominant 
in a substantial public choice literature which ponders the conditions under which the rule of 
law is in equilibrium and hence a stable socio-political institutional framework and form of 
association (Holmes 2003). In this literature, the possibility that the rule of law can be used 
‘as a political weapon’ (Maravall 2003) is contemplated as one which presents no conceptual 
tension or contradiction. 
Second, some scholars have seen the rule of law in procedural as well as formal 
terms.  For example, in Jeremy Waldron’s view (Waldron 2008; 2011; cf. Shklar 1964), the 
rule of law expresses not merely formal constraints but procedural commitments which imply 
a certain interpersonal attitude. A commitment such as equality before the law discloses a 
normative view of respect for persons as agents who must be not only informed in advance 
of the content of legal norms so as to have the opportunity to adjust their conduct accordingly 
but also have a role in speaking and being heard by a neutral tribunal in any legal process in 
which they are concerned.  Waldron here builds on Lon Fuller’s (1964) conception of eight 
canons of ‘the inner morality of law’ – a set of formal tenets to which Raz also subscribes, 
but which Fuller saw as carrying moral quality as a mode of governance, as more fully 
elaborated by Waldron.   
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Third, others have been inclined to conceptualise the rule of law in much more 
ambitious, ‘thick’ or ‘substantive’ terms.  In the view of scholars like Brian Tamanaha (2006; 
2012) – but also of influential judges like Tom Bingham (2010) and Susanne Baer (2018) – 
the rule of law should be seen in terms not merely of the formal and procedural values 
enunciated by the first two conceptions, but also of a wide range of institutional arrangements 
rooted in normative commitments, many of them strongly associated with liberal democracy.  
In this substantive conception, concomitants of a rule of law worth the name include 
constitutionalism quite generally; a separation of powers or system of checks and balances;  
human rights – certainly civil and political, perhaps also economic and social; judicial review 
of at least executive and, perhaps, legislative power; adequate access to justice; and, ideally, 
an international legal order capable of insisting on the sway of the rule of law and human 
rights.  While these scholars recognise that history presents many examples of evil, unjust or 
oppressive things being done in the name of law and in conformity with the formal precepts 
of legalism, in their view these appeals are distortions of the ‘true’ concept of the rule of law. 
If law is used merely as a means to an end, the distinctive mode of mutually respectful, 
agency-recognising association reflected in the ideal of the rule of law is not present; if it is 
used for ends which are discriminatory, oppressive, arbitrary or otherwise unjust, this counts 
as ‘abusive’ or ‘discriminatory’ ‘legalism’ or ‘autocratic constitutionalism’ (Landau 2013; 
Scheppele 2018) rather than a genuine instance of the rule of law.  As will be evident, there 
is a close kinship between this debate within rule of law scholarship and the longstanding 
debate about the respective strengths of positivist and natural law conceptions of law (Lacey 
2008b).   
Fourth, some scholars have resisted the demand to conceptualise the rule of law in 
terms of either its form or its content.  While recognising that many of the procedural and 
institutional arrangements canvassed in the first three traditions will indeed be central to rule 
of law ideals and practices, scholars like Martin Krygier (2009; 2017a,b,c; forthcoming) have 
taken a teleological or functional approach to the rule of law as a set of ideals and 
arrangements oriented to tempering power.  Crucially, this will involve not only arrangements 
geared to limiting, constraining or rendering power accountable, but also enabling and 
strengthening power, not least by enhancing its legitimacy. A distinguishing feature of this 
cluster of approaches is their contextualism: on a functional approach, it is a given that, while 
genuinely representing an ideal, and recognising the moral value of the rule of law as a ‘mode 
of association’ between people (Postema 2014, p. 24), its content, what the rule of law ideally 
requires, and the institutional arrangements which are needed to give it effect, will vary with 
time and space, and will be shaped by a range of cultural, institutional and political conditions 
(see Lacey 2007; Loughlin 2018).  These approaches, like substantive approaches, are 
sensitive to the danger that the rule of law may present a superficial form rather than being 
fully embedded in conventions and internal attitudes. They accordingly resist any 
‘idealism/realism’ dichotomy (Adams et al. 2017) and insist that the values to which the rule 
of law aspires can only be met in terms of a close understanding of how particular social and 
political systems work. 
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In comparative terms, for example, Cheeseman’s analysis of the rule of law (and its 
abuse) in Myanmar (2015, pp. 261-3) presents a distinctive contrast between the rule of law 
and law and order as conceived by the military regime, and points out that this differs 
substantially from the opposition with exceptionalism and decisionism prevailing in Thailand, 
with significant consequences for the space available for the rule of law to operate as an 
oppositional discursive frame within civil society.   And in a historical analysis of the 
development of the rule of law in England, I have argued (Lacey 2007; 2008b) that we need 
to appreciate the role of context in illuminating not merely the concept of the rule of law but 
also its purpose, function or social role, along with the preconditions under which particular 
conceptions of, or dispositions towards, the rule of law are likely to take hold.  For example, 
in a highly centralized and authoritarian system such as the monarchy of early modern 
England, it is not clear that the operative concept of the rule of law can intelligibly be read as 
implying the universal application of law, reaching even to the sovereign.  Certainly, a notion 
that the rule of law proscribed the exercise of arbitrary power by the monarch has roots 
stretching back far earlier than modern constitutionalism (Loughlin 2018; Palombella 2009; 
2010; Reid 2004).  But a broader notion of the universality of law’s reach– central to modern 
notions of the rule of law - was the object of long political contestation, and took centuries to 
be accomplished.  We can acknowledge that the Eighteenth-Century conception of the rule 
of law in England was different to that in the Twelfth Century without concluding that no such 
conception existed: indeed, as in Cheeseman’s (2015) study of contemporary Myanmar, it 
existed in part as a critical conception which informed the political conflicts which shaped 
modern constitutional structures.  
In other cases, it is not so much the development of political ideas as the practical 
preconditions for realizing them which underpins the changing contours of the rule of law.   
An example here would be the tenet, widely shared in today’s constitutional democracies, 
that the law should be publicized and intelligible.  Even today, this ideal is difficult to realize.  
But it would have been a far more distant ideal in societies with very low levels of literacy and 
without developed technologies of communication such as printing, let alone digital 
technology.  The ideal that official action should be congruent with announced law must have 
a significantly different meaning in today’s highly organized, professionalized criminal justice 
systems than in a system like that of England prior to the criminal justice reforms of the early 
Nineteenth Century - a system in which criminal justice enforcement mechanisms were 
vestigial, with no organized police force or prosecution, and much enforcement practice lying 
in the hands of lay prosecutors, parish constables and justices of the peace (King 2006; 
Langbein 2003).  Institutional features of Eighteenth Century English criminal justice also had 
significant implications for the law’s achievement of coherence.  While the system of 
precedent conduced to both substantive coherence and even-handedness in enforcement, 
the relatively disorganized mechanisms for appeal and law reporting gave rise to significant 
regional variations – particularly in relation to criminal adjudication handled by lay justices 
rather than assize judges.  Hence for many decades, discretionary arrangements, inimical to 
today’s view of adequate levels of coherence and congruence, were regarded not merely as 
acceptable but as consistent with respect for the rule of law (King 2000).  For the rule of law 
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was embedded within a highly personalized model of sovereign authority; one in which the 
discretionary power of mercy was a core rather than a penumbral feature (Hay 1975; 
Thompson 1975).   
Ideals themselves are constrained by existing institutional capacities.  To take some 
recent examples, judicial review – now seen as a core component of the rule of law in western 
democracies – is a relatively new invention in most of them; only the United States 
constitutionalized this arrangement from the start, with many European countries adding it in 
their 19th Century constitutional settlements, but the UK assembling it, and in quite a limited 
way, only in the latter part of the 20th Century.  The first steps towards institutionalising an 
international rule of law emerged only in the Twentieth Century and that of an ambitious, 
human rights-oriented international law, only after the Second World War.  All these 
conceptions of the rule of law are born of their environment: the ideal takes its complexion 
both from perceived problems - arising from war, revolution, atrocities or ideological struggles 
- and from perceived institutional capacities.   And this is key to unravelling the complex 
relationship between populism and the rule of law. 
 
 
APPROACHING POPULISM 
 
Like the literature on the rule of law, that on populism falls along a spectrum between broadly 
positive work (mainly in political science, for example Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018; Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017) and interpretive/normative work (mainly in political and social theory: 
Ackerman 2015; Mounk 2018; Muller 2016; Urbinati 2014).   There are marked differences 
of view on whether populism is to be feared or applauded;  a wide ideological spectrum 
between both those supporting and those fearing populism, with the former reaching from 
Carl Schmitt to Ernesto Laclau (Laclau 2005; Laclau & Mouffe 2001; Schmitt 1927);  varying 
approaches to the conditions which spawn populism; and specific disagreements on the 
strength of what Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2017) call the ‘elective affinity’ of populism with 
mechanisms of direct democracy such as referenda.  But there is broad agreement on the 
main conceptual components of populism as a form of political discourse.  Essentially, 
populism is a highly moralized approach to politics which pitches a homogeneous ‘we the 
people,’ often conceived in ethnic or national terms, embodied in a leader who speaks for 
and expresses the will of that undifferentiated collectivity, against a presumptively ‘corrupt’ – 
hence the tendency to conspiracy theories in this genre of political discourse -  ‘elite’ (as well 
as against ‘outsider’ minorities of various kinds). Populism is 
 
a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, “the pure people” versus “the 
corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the 
volonté générale (general will) of the people (…) (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 
2017, p. 6, emphasis in original). 
III Working paper 28                                                            Nicola Lacey 
 
 
10 
 
 
This implies that the particular shape of the ‘interpretive frame’ or ‘mental map’ 
through which social actors comprehend the political world in a society influenced by populist 
discourse will be determined by a range of contingencies and can incorporate conflicting 
ideologies.  Hence populism may take left or right wing forms; moreover populists may aspire 
to realise some of the values which also characterize not only democracy but even – as in 
the case of forms of egalitarianism – liberalism.  Yet populism is fundamentally at odds with 
liberal democracy because – for all that it takes off from a notion of popular power and 
sovereignty – it is monistic rather than pluralistic, monarchic rather than diarchic, exclusive 
rather than inclusive, with a vertical rather than a horizontal vision of power.  Given that the 
populist leader, though only a part of the whole, speaks for that whole, it is not even clear 
that populism tends in a deep sense to popular participation: indeed, most commentators 
agree that under certain conditions, populist leadership tends towards autocracy. In relation 
to Europe and North America, a particularly important aspect of populism’s anti-pluralism is 
its hostility to a conception of politics seen in terms of competition between and compromise 
among interests.  Hence there is a tension between populism and multi-party democracy – 
indeed between populism and parties as legitimate political actors with discrete power.   
Yet while, as Urbinati (2014) puts it, populism ‘disfigures’ democracy (cf. Muller 2016, 
p. 34), it arguably arises out of some irresolvable tensions within the liberal democratic ideal 
itself.  Populism is, as Urbinati observes (2014, p. 135) in some sense ‘parasitical’ on 
representative democracy, from which it takes its image of the sovereign people; but it reacts 
against the inevitable tension within liberal representative democracy between the ideal of 
popular representation and the rules and conventions, such as constitutional arrangements, 
human rights, judicial review, which constrain the power of popular sovereignty.  Indeed, as 
Norberto Bobbio (1984; cf. Canovan 1999; Rovira Kaltwasser 2014; Walker forthcoming) put 
it, populism arises in part from the ‘broken promises’ of democracy itself: ‘the people’ can 
never truly rule; precisely because of heterogeneity and conflicts of value and interest, some 
voices always prevail.  Hence ‘[p]opulism exploits the tensions that are inherent to liberal 
democracy, which tries to find a harmonious equilibrium between majority rule and minority 
rights. This equilibrium is almost impossible’ (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, p. 82).  But 
this also implies a contradiction at the heart of populism, and one which further illuminates its 
tendency towards authoritarianism and against democracy.  For in order to preserve its highly 
moralized symbolic fantasy of a pure homogenous ‘we the people,’ the real voices of dissent 
and variation must not be heard too loudly.  Hence while populists are not against 
constitutions as such, and a populist leader can indeed colonise the state and the legal 
system by enacting a ‘populist constitution,’ the stability of such a settlement is constantly 
threatened by both the risk that it will produce the ‘wrong outcomes’  from the populist leader’s 
point of view, and the risk of pluralism reasserting itself, leading to constitutional conflict 
(Muller 2016, pp. 37-39).   
Moreover, the perceived deficits and failures of liberal democracy to represent an 
adequate range of interests have been a significant spur to populism, particularly in Europe, 
where the impulse of the reconstruction of democracy after the Second World War was to 
build structures to limit the sway of popular will, not least in its capacity to encroach on 
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minorities (Muller 2016, Chapter 3; see also Bogg & Freedland 2018; Kochenov  2017; 
Lindseth 2017).  As Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser put it, ‘[i]n a world that is dominated by 
democracy and liberalism, populism has essentially become an illiberal democratic response 
to undemocratic liberalism’ (2017, p. 116).  The populist resurgence has undoubtedly been 
exacerbated by two further large facts.  First, the fundamental restructuring of advanced 
political economies since the 1970s in the wake of de-industrialisation and under conditions 
of intensifying globalization has implied a dramatic decline in the relative economic and social 
standing of a large group, and a form of polarization and economic exclusion which has 
fostered widespread resentment and found expression in forms of identity politics such as 
nationalism and nativism.  Second, elected governments have proved ineffective in 
countering these trends, and indeed are widely seen as having encouraged or exacerbated 
them by developing ‘neoliberal’ economic policies focused on market competition in a 
globalizing economy.  As the case of Latin America shows, long-running radical social and 
economic inequalities, when combined with a history of democratic governments, can fuel 
populism by undermining the perceived legitimacy of governing elites – a situation which now 
prevails in both Europe and the US.  The financial crisis of 2008 further damaged the standing 
of politicians because austerity policies and retrenchment of public services furthered 
polarization between ‘winners and losers in the knowledge economy’ (Iversen & Soskice 
2018).  In the EU, these developments were further exacerbated by the imposition of the rigid 
Euro system on economies with markedly varied institutional structures and, hence, 
comparative advantage, implying fiscal constraints across the EU which had originally been 
conceived in terms of the political imperatives of Germany (Carlin & Boltho 2013; Hall 2014) 
– prompting the economic crises of the Southern European nations, followed by bailouts 
which were perceived as punitive and discriminatory.  The refugee crisis added a further 
impetus to what was already a growing projection of resentment among those who had lost 
out onto outsiders, fueling a vituperative and widespread populist nativism and anti-
immigration sentiment. 
It is important to remember, of course, that widespread though the emergence of 
populist political discourse, parties, leaders and agenda in both Europe and North America 
has been, the number of countries in which we can genuinely talk of a populist system of 
government remains, for the moment, small.  The multi-party, parliamentary systems of 
Europe provide some protection, as compared with presidential systems (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017, p. 75); and the orientation to consensus and bargaining of the sectoral 
Proportional Representation (PR) systems of the coordinated market economies (Hall & 
Soskice 2001; Lijphart 1984; 1999) provide further protection. As Bogg & Freedland (2018) 
put it, while the popular-democracy limiting and technocratic tendencies of the EU and the 
highly integrated post-war constitutional settlements of countries like Germany may 
themselves have indirectly stoked populist resentment, they have also, as compared with the 
decentralized systems of liberal market economies like the UK (Hall & Soskice 2001) 
provided some protection for the rule of law, for example through constitutional courts (Bogg 
& Freedland 2018; cf. Ackerman 2015).  But the economic changes canvassed above have 
begun to erode the structure of the party system by fragmenting the sectoral interests or 
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‘pillars’ on which the political systems of these countries depended.  The limited extent to 
which the model of party competition, compromise and pluralism, along with the liberal 
democratic constitutionalist mentality which institutionalizes it, in the post-communist regimes 
of Central and Eastern Europe (Krygier 2017a) perhaps explains why the starkest European 
examples of populism come from that region.  The Orbán regime in Hungary is one example; 
the Polish government has also moved in a substantially populist direction; and the signs 
accumulate that, limited though US presidential powers over domestic policy have often been 
taken to be, Donald Trump’s populist style of leadership is having a significant effect on US 
institutions beyond the presidency.    
But the limited number of cases in which the hold of populism on political actors and 
institutions would justify our speaking in terms of a populist regime does not imply that 
populism has only limited relevance for politics and, potentially, for the rule of law in Europe 
and North America. For – and in spite of its capacity to have, as one political discourse on 
the democratic scene, positive as well as negative effects on the quality of democracy -  
populism can affect the conduct and integrity of liberal democratic politics in a range of ways 
short of capturing the governing regime.  The power of populism should therefore not be 
counted merely in terms of the electoral votes a populist party or leader obtains, but also in 
terms of ‘the ability to put topics on the agenda (…) and the capacity to shape public policies’ 
(Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, p. 98). The briefest survey of recent political 
developments in Europe and North America provides ample evidence of these agenda-
setting and policy impact effects.  In Britain, while the genesis of the referendum on EU 
membership cannot exclusively be laid at the door of populism, both the result and the impact 
of Nigel Farage’s populist, nativist UKIP party on the conduct of the campaign, particularly in 
terms of stirring up anger with political elites, distrust of experts, and hostility towards 
migrants, has all the hallmarks of populism.  More generally, British immigration policy since 
(at least) 2010 has been hugely shaped by populist anti-immigration sentiment.   The threat 
to some (particularly Conservative) parliamentary seats from UKIP, alongside the 
longstanding anti-EU sentiment of a small core in the Tory Party, helped to shoehorn a range 
of populist policies onto the government’s agenda, as well as influencing the tone of political 
discourse, and engendering a pervasive distrust in transnational and international 
governance which is a natural concomitant of nationalist resurgence.  Across the channel in 
Western Europe and the Nordic region, where some countries’ PR electoral systems  may 
facilitate the constitution of small, issue-rather than sectoral- or interest-based parties, 
nationalist, anti-immigrant, anti-outsider parties such as the Front National in France, the 
Danish People’s Party, the AfD in Germany, and equivalents in the Netherlands, Austria and 
Sweden, have begun to put pressure on the established parties, with the FN leader Marine 
Le Pen reaching the second round of the last French presidential election.  Further east, in 
countries like Hungary and Poland, we have arguably seen a transition from populist agenda-
setting and policy impact to – at least in the case of Hungary – a fully populist regime. As we 
shall see in the following sections, it is these diffuse agenda-setting and policy impacts of the 
growth of populism which pose some of the most urgent threats to the rule of law in Europe. 
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ANALYTIC LINKS BETWEEN POPULISM AND THREATS TO THE RULE OF 
LAW 
 
Populism, then, is an ambivalent political discourse: it emerges from one set of values central 
to the aspirations and origins of liberal representative democracy; and under certain 
circumstances, the infusion of populist discourse into democratic debate can have positive 
effects in inter alia encouraging participation from groups alienated from politics or, in its left 
wing form, facilitating egalitarian social policies, as in several Latin American cases, notably 
Brazil.   There is, nonetheless, a straightforward analytic connection between the populist 
style of politics and an impatience with the rule of law (Urbinati 2014, pp. 13, 129, 153). This 
is quite simply because a populist leader claims, in him- or her-self, to express the will of the 
‘pure’ people, and any institutional structure which questions that political expression, tends 
to place constraints on its execution,  or divides ‘the people’s’ power via checks and balances, 
is liable to come into conflict with the populist leader.  Carl Schmitt is a familiar point of 
reference here (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, p. 18).  The populist leader’s claim to 
express the people’s will does not brook any system of checks and balances such as that 
envisaged by modern constitutionalism, for the latter is premised on a pluralist view of politics.  
Moreover the polarized and moralistic, friend/enemy, ‘pure us/corrupt them’ tenor of populism 
tends to erode the usual norms of civility  - ‘ to flaunt the law… to revel in norm-breaking, 
coarseness and incivility’ (Ostiguy & Roberts 2016, p. 43) within political discourse. 
Accordingly, both constitutional rights and the institutions which protect them – notably the 
judiciary, but also the media – are often targets of populist criticism (Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser 2017, p. 95; Muller 2016, p. 36).   Muller (2016, p. 8) sees populism as a form of 
exclusionary identity politics which tends to undermine democracy and identifies three distinct 
manifestation of its logic: 
 
a kind of colonization of the state, mass clientelism as well as what political 
scientists sometimes call “discriminatory legalism,” and, finally, the systematic 
repression of civil society (Muller 2016, p. 28). 
 
Populists do not necessarily eschew constitutionalism altogether.  But populist 
constitutionalism is a tricky matter, since the creation of separate and mutually checking 
governmental institutions necessarily gives rise to the possibility of conflict between them – 
a conflict which is inconsistent with the populist monarchic claim to express the people’s will.  
Hence courts in particular are liable to populist suspicion, the hostility stemming from their 
capacity to constrain political power being reinforced by their standing as elitists or experts 
and their distance from ‘the people’.  Here, the availability of a purely formal conception of 
the rule of law – the rule of law not merely as useful ‘knife’ (Raz 1979) but even as ‘weapon’ 
(Maravall 2003) may become a tool in the hands of the populist constitutionalist.  For the rule 
of law not only constrains but enables governmental power, and populist governments need 
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law as much as any other regime.  Hence courts and other checking institutions need to be 
co-opted – as they may be by court-packing, intimidation of the judiciary or other mechanisms 
such as those we have recently seen deployed in Poland and Hungary.  And once institutions 
such as the judiciary have been commandeered or co-opted, we see what scholars have 
called, variously, forms of ‘abusive  constitutionalism’ or ‘discriminatory’ or ‘autocratic 
legalism’ (Maravall 2003; Muller 2017; Scheppele 2018) in which the law itself is used to 
persecute minorities, to punish dissent, and to enforce executive power discursively 
legitimized as the people’s will.    This can take the form of not only a corrupting politicization 
of the law and the judiciary but also of a ‘judicialisation of politics,’ where the courts or other 
legal processes such as impeachment are used for political purposes (Muller 2016).  For not 
only adherents of substantive, thick conceptions of the rule of law but also those who take a 
functional view of the rule of law as inherently concerned with tempering power (Krygier 2009; 
2017a,b,c), this amounts to a corruption of the rule of law: what we might call rule by law 
rather than the rule of law, albeit that the specific form which that subversion takes will vary 
across time and place (Cheeseman 2015; Lacey 2007). 
 
 
CONTINGENT LINKS BETWEEN POPULISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF 
THE RULE OF LAW 
 
The analytic tensions between populism and the rule of law which I canvassed in the last 
section realise themselves primarily in populist regimes.   Yet they are also of relevance to 
the much larger range of countries in which populists do not control government, but in which 
populist political movements have some significant presence: within the government – as in 
the case of the US under the Trump presidency; as nationalist or otherwise populist parties, 
as with the French Front National or the German AfD; or as powerful factions within major 
parties, as with the vehemently anti-EU wing of the British Conservative Party; or even as 
popular social movements such as the Tea Party, Vote Leave or Occupy.  And in these 
countries, whether and how the links between populism and erosion of the rule of law 
announce themselves depends on many contingencies.  Hence any full understanding of 
these links must be system- and context- specific.  The vulnerability of any system to populist-
inspired erosion of the constraints on power offered by the rule of law will depend on the 
factors such as the structure of its political system – notably the electoral system and the 
internal rules of its political parties which govern matters such as candidate selection and the 
election of a leader; the standing and the strength of the professional culture of its judiciary; 
the capacity of its legal, political and economic institutions to resolve social conflicts and to 
command reasonable levels of respect – itself shaped by the geopolitical and macro-
economic environment.  As Bogg & Freedland aptly put it, ‘we need to explore the 
complementarities between political and legal institutions in the domain of fundamental rights, 
rather than to view the problem in terms of a simple institutional trade-off between 
‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’’ (Bogg & Freedland 2018, pp. 11-12, emphasis in original).  It 
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hence becomes possible to say something at a general level about the ways in which these 
very common, increasing, and partial forms of political populism may affect the robustness of 
the rule of law even in countries whose systems are fundamentally shaped in terms of liberal 
democratic values. In this section, I distinguish four different mechanisms, giving examples 
of each from Europe and the United States. 
We have already mentioned the first two: those of agenda-setting and policy impact. 
A small populist faction within a large party, a small populist party, or a powerful populist who 
holds elected office, may be able to have a decisive impact on a country’s political agenda 
and in specific policy terms.  Probably the most spectacular example here is Donald Trump’s 
power to set an isolationist agenda through trade and other aspects of foreign policy, in the 
name of ‘Making America Great Again’ - not to mention to shape immigration policy and 
practice in decisive and human-rights-threatening ways (Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018; Litman 
2018).  Perhaps yet more worrying is the diffuse, yet hard to measure, impact of his populist 
and court-disrespecting rhetoric on practices at state and local level in relation to matters 
such as voter registration, redistricting, judicial appointments and indeed general law 
interpretation and enforcement (Zengerie 2018; Scheindlin 2018).   The US constitutional 
structure which also happens to give him a constitutional right to nominate Supreme Court 
Justices and hence to shape the political complexion of the Court for the next three decades 
– as illustrated by the appointments of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh - exemplifies a very 
particular vulnerability in the US system. Recent US politics reveal how much the rule of law 
depends on self-restraint, on the diffusion of a culture of respect for law, and of respect for 
the institutional integrity and independence of legal institutions, which it is impossible to fully 
to embed within a constitution itself.   
In Europe – both in the EU as a transnational political entity but also in particular 
nations – the inability to find a stable solution or even a broad consensus about the refugee 
crisis is another good example of both the agenda-setting and policy impact of populist politics 
via erosion of the authority of the main political parties. And in Britain, the fear among MP’s 
of the threat from UKIP in leave-voting constituencies has almost certainly shaped the 
Westminster Parliament’s difficulty in reaching a compromise agreement on how to redefine 
Britain’s relationship with the EU.  Such impacts come about in part through corrosive 
attitudinal changes.  For example, evidence mounts that the Leave campaign exhibited a 
characteristically populist contempt for the electoral laws within which it should have been 
working (Graham-Harrison 2018), while senior members of the Government, including the 
former Foreign Secretary, have cast doubt on whether it will be Government policy to respect 
all aspects of existing Treaty obligations – notably financial obligations – on exit from the EU 
(Freedland 2018).   
Two further potential and diffuse impacts of what we might call partial populism on 
the rule of law are also worthy of consideration.  These are, first, the capacity of populism to 
affect the exercise of discretionary powers and, second, the upshot of what I will call 
‘convention-trashing’. Taking the example of discretionary powers, it is perhaps most useful 
to focus on judges.  It is widely recognized that judges enjoy a range of discretionary powers 
and considerable interpretive latitude.  They are also, to state the obvious, human beings 
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who are subject to the usual range of pressures, albeit that their institutional role and their 
professional training and culture equip them, ideally, with some very particular capacities for 
independent judgment.  It is hard not to worry, nonetheless, that incidents such as the 
infamous British Daily Mail ‘Enemies of the People’ headline mentioned above, or Donald 
Trump’s personal attacks on judges and law officers, will not have some impact in inhibiting 
the full exercise of that independence.  This sort of impact on discretionary powers is, 
admittedly, hard to track empirically (though see McCarthy 2018); but there is some evidence 
from the more discretionary aspects of judicial decision-making which gives it both indirect 
and direct support.  One example might be thought to be the upward travel of sentencing 
severity in both the US and the UK during the era of so-called ‘penal populism’ (Garland 
2001a,b) – a not inconsiderable amount of it taking place in the absence of any change in 
sentencing guidelines or statutory maxima. Another is a recent study (Brandes forthcoming; 
see also R. Girard, unpublished doctoral dissertation chapter) of the discretionary practice of 
domestic courts’ citing international or transnational law, which suggests that in countries 
where populist hostility to supra-national legal orders is strong, we may see a decline in such 
citations – a matter of particular concern because of the capacity of international and 
transnational law to provide extra protection for the rights of minorities, to strengthen 
pluralism and to counter polarization.  This argument applies, a fortiori, to the wide 
discretionary powers of a range of law enforcement and regulatory agencies. 
Moving to the fourth potential upshot of partial populism for the rule of law, 
convention-trashing, we return to the a theme which arose in our discussion of the rule of 
law: that the fullest expression of its aspiration – and, we might add, of constitutionalism more 
generally – depends upon a set of attitudes and an accepted mode of association which 
cannot be captured or completely enforced by rules, however elaborate.  This implies that 
the internalization of the normative ideals associated with the rule of law by those who 
exercise power is key to its robustness.  This is particularly evident in relation to the elaborate 
conventions which surround the operation of any constitution.  Populist attitudes are, 
however, as we have seen, impatient of constraints. And where conventions or 
understandings are casually broken by populists, these can be very much harder to repair, 
and the relevant actors very much harder to discipline or restrain, than in the case of more 
blatant breaches of established constitutional norms.  Recent examples include Donald 
Trump’s brazen flouting of the long-established conventions about conflicts of interest and 
nepotism, by failing effectively to separate himself from his business interests; his incontinent 
invective on Twitter; and his decision to move a large part of his family into the White House 
in positions of very significant executive power (Litman 2018).  They also include the 
revelation arising from recent events in Hungary and Poland that while compliance with the 
rule of law is one of the conditions of accession to the EU, continued compliance is a 
convention in the sense that it depends on self-restraint, with the EU possessing only 
relatively blunt tools to discipline countries which dismantle key aspects of it, notably the 
independence of the judiciary (Kochenov 2017; Scheppele 2017).  The Article 7 infringement 
procedure recently invoked against Hungary and under consideration in relation to Poland 
could lead to sanctions, but may be liable to feed the very populism which underlies the 
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problem it seeks to address. In the international perhaps yet more than the national sphere, 
the robustness of norms of legality, as of norms such as human rights, is substantially 
dependent on voluntary compliance. 
 
 
BEYOND POPULISM: CRIMINALISATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
 
The growth of populist sentiment and of populist political actors in Europe and North America 
has, then, presented a number of challenges to the rule of law, and Justice Susanne Baer 
(2018) is right that extreme vigilance is needed to protect legal institutions and in particular 
independent judiciaries in this climate. In this context, it is interesting to consider whether the 
election of judges which prevails in many US jurisdictions the criminal justice system provides 
protection for independence via the democratic legitimacy which elected judges claim, or 
implies vulnerability to populist influence via electoral pressures (as suggested by case 
studies on sentencing: Bogira 2005).  However, as Baer (2018) also notes, it is important to 
acknowledge that not all threats to the rule of law and to judicial independence come from 
populist politics.  So it is relevant to ponder the question of how relatively important populism 
has been in the development of criminalisation in recent years, given that scholars concerned 
with a perceived upward trend in penal severity and an ever more extensive legislative resort 
to criminalisation, particularly in the competitive, liberal market political economies of Britain 
and the United States (Lacey 2008a), have often referred to this as a form of ‘penal populism’ 
(Pratt 2006; cf. Bottoms 1995).   
Certainly, we can find examples which fit the conception of populism adopted in this 
paper.  For instance, we could see the origins of California’s ‘three strikes and you’re out’ 
law, which was a product of California’s system of direct democracy via citizen-initiated 
propositions (Zimring et al. 2001), as exemplifying a certain aspect of populism as direct 
responsiveness to popular will.   And we could see a range of legislative initiatives in England 
and Wales – the increasing tendency to resort to ever more specific criminal prohibitions to 
address particular social problems, from corporate manslaughter to anti-social behavior via 
dangerous dogs – as expressing a concern to show responsiveness to popular demands.  
Indeed, one might even see criminal law as increasingly responsive to the fragmented 
demands of a diverse collection of identity politics around single issues, each of them 
constituting a discrete ‘outsider’ or ‘enemy’ (Hall et al. 1978).  More obliquely, we might see 
the concern with security which underlines the popularity of criminalisation (Loader & Walker 
2007; Neocleous 2008; Ramsay 2012; Zedner 2009) as itself a product of a certain kind of 
disenchantment with the efficacy of government.   
But ‘penal populism’ of course predates the populist resurgence which has been my 
main focus, and it has deep historical and institutional roots.  Much of the drive for 
criminalisation and penal severity comes not from populism as discussed in this paper, but 
rather from fear and insecurity attendant on crime, that fear and insecurity being projected 
onto ‘outsiders’ in the form of offenders. There is a structural analogy with populism here, but 
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the outsiders are not necessarily the same as the enemy outsiders on which populism 
currently has its focus.  Indeed, they are disproportionately members of the groups whose 
economic dislocation and exclusion has fed the populist surge of recent years.  So it is 
probably more accurate to see overcriminalization (Husak 2007) and penal severity as 
themselves products of some of the larger economic, social and political forces which have 
created populism itself: perceived weaknesses in national state sovereignty, prompting a 
resort to criminalisation as one of the few tools of governance still within nation state control; 
social conflict; a failure to ensure that an adequate majority feel that they have a stake in the 
prevailing order (Hochschild 2016; Wuthnow 2018); and persistent inequality.  Likewise, in a 
self-reinforcing cycle, the failures of political leadership which stoke populism via distrust in 
government are in part a product of the erosion of party strength produced by populism itself.  
The causal linkages here are complex.  For example, arguably one of the most urgent threats 
to the rule of law in the field of criminal law in England and Wales lies in the steady erosion 
of access to justice implied by swingeing cuts to court services, to the police and the Crown 
Prosecution Service, and to legal aid, which have been an offshoot of austerity policies 
(Bingham 2010; Secret Barrister 2018). And austerity politics have both stoked populism by 
exacerbating economic exclusion and polarization and been fed by populist resentment of 
the reach of welfare benefits to ‘outsiders’.   
There are, however, two areas in which developments in criminalisation might be 
thought to have been shaped by populism in the sense under consideration here. The first of 
these is anti-terrorism law, which in the UK as in several other countries increasingly deploys 
the very notion of an alien ‘enemy within’ on which populism feeds (cf. Jakobs 1985). Over 
the last two decades, we have seen a vivid case of the normalization of powers previously 
seen as exceptional, with a substantial amount of legislation directly or indirectly geared to 
the criminalisation of terrorism. The extraordinary events of September 2001 are, of course, 
an important part of the genesis of this new legislative concern with the criminalisation of 
terrorism. The anti-terror reaction has created a wave of criminalisation—particularly of what 
we might call preliminary or pre-inchoate activities—which significantly expands the 
boundaries of criminal law. In doing so, it adds to police and prosecutorial power, weakens 
defence lawyers, curtails the scope of judicial discretion and, in some of its more radical 
‘adjustments’ to normal standards of procedure, directly undermines the rule of law by 
deploying some of the methods of terror itself.  And beyond domestic criminalisation, 
evidence accumulates that a certain lawless mentality increasingly pervades US, British and 
many other countries’ conduct of foreign policy, notably in terms of the use of drone attacks 
and practices of rendition (Scheppele 2013; Waldron 2010).   
Implicit in the structure of many of these terrorism offences we see something akin 
to ‘enemy criminal law’ (Jakobs 1985) or character responsibility (Lacey 2016, Chapter 5): 
the idea that, on top of committing or planning acts of violence, there is something additionally 
and intrinsically wrong about being a certain kind of person, engaged in a certain kind of 
activity—an aggravation of blameworthiness which justifies a special criminalisation regime. 
Notwithstanding the House of Lords’ finding that one of the most egregious, and populist, 
aspects of the legislation (the application of indefinite detention exclusively to foreign 
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nationals) contravened the Human Rights Act (A v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] UKHL 56), much of the counter-terrorism legislation of recent years—
notably the control order, implemented as a result of the House of Lords’ decision—is redolent 
of the criminalisation of status.  The implicit assumption is that there is a finite number of ‘bad 
people’ who are ‘terrorists,’ and if we can simply detain or ‘take out’ enough of them, the world 
will be a safer place for those of ‘good character,’ who alone deserve the full protections of 
the rule of law. But while these themes are reminiscent of aspects of populist discourse, they 
can hardly be said to have been driven by populist politics alone: after all, they have been 
enacted, albeit with differing forms of intensity, widely across the world in response to the 
perceived threat of transnational terrorism. 
The other – and related - area of criminalisation which on the face of it has been 
shaped by populism is so-called ‘crimmigration’ (Strumpf 2006). This refers to the increasing 
resort to criminalisation or to quasi-criminalisation (e.g., via administrative detention) as a 
way of disciplining, excluding and indeed expelling migrants or those seen as presumptively 
unentitled (Aas & Bosworth 2013; Ackerman & Furman 2014; Aliverti 2013; Aliverti & 
Bosworth 2017; Anderson 2013).  The blurring of the boundaries between administrative and 
criminal law, notably in the case of immigration detention, and of the boundaries between 
civil and criminal law, as in the use of a range of civil, typically preventive orders whose 
breach nonetheless implies criminal or quasi-criminal liability, is of particular concern in terms 
of the threat to migrants’ and asylum seekers’ human rights but also of erosion of the rule of 
law quite generally (Bogg & Freedland 2018; Zedner 2016).  Yet even here, the causation 
may be somewhat more complex than at first appears.  As Vanessa Barker has argued in a 
powerful recent analysis of the emergence of ‘penal nationalism’ in relation to migration in 
Sweden, ‘problems with pluralism, ethnic diversity and immigration are much more 
mainstream, long lasting and institutionalized than the current focus on populism allows’ 
(Barker 2018, p. 53).  So while the emergence of penal nationalism in countries such as 
Hungary and Poland may be genuinely drive by populism (Haney 2016), this is not 
necessarily so:  each case requires careful interpretation.  In the case of Sweden, the clue to 
the remarkable reversal of the country’s traditionally open immigration policy represented by 
the closing of the border with Denmark in late 2015 is to be found in a concern to protect the 
Nordic welfare state, whose well known generosity is seen to be economically and politically 
sustainable only for insiders, hence producing a kind of ‘welfare chauvinism’ (Kitschelt 1995).  
And while, as Barker (2018) shows,  these exclusionary dynamics of the Nordic welfare 
system undoubtedly threaten a range of real harms and represent what we might think of as 
the less appealing underside of the communitarian dynamics of solidaristic Nordic 
conceptions of membership and belonging, they are nonetheless significantly different from 
the forms of racist, anti-migrant populism which characterize extremist parties in, for example, 
Austria, France or the Netherlands.  Penal nationalism, seen as ‘a form of state power that 
relies on the coercive tools and moral weight of criminal justice to respond to unwanted 
mobility in the service of national interests’ (Barker 2018, p. 89) may most certainly threaten 
aspects of the rule of law including generality, publicity and congruence, as well as the 
III Working paper 28                                                            Nicola Lacey 
 
 
20 
 
 
robustness of human rights.  It may even produce a democratic deficit (Barker 2018, p. 138).  
But it is not necessarily a straightforward result of populism.   
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In short, populism is currently creating significant risks to the rule of law in Europe and the 
United States through agenda-setting, policy impact, the shaping of discretionary decisions 
and convention-trashing.  However, the specific force of these populist dynamics is mediated 
by a range of contingencies in particular countries and regions: contingencies relating to 
social, political and economic history and the cultural mentalities which this history has 
engendered; legal and political and economic institutional framework; as well as the specific 
form which populism takes.  The analytic tendency of populism in an anti-rule of law direction, 
then, can only be the start of any inquiry into the actual sway of populism in particular times 
and places, through a careful comparative study of the interaction between institutional 
structures and national and international context. 
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